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Austin	on	Perception,	Knowledge	and	Meaning	Penultimate	draft	3.14.16.	Forthcoming	in	Interpreting	Austin	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2017,	ed.	Savas	Tsohatzidis)		Krista	Lawlor			Interpreting	Austin	on	perception	Austin’s	Sense	and	Sensibilia	(1962)	generates	wildly	different	reactions	among	philosophers.	On	the	one	hand,	some	allow	that	the	text	offers	acute	criticisms	of	the	argument	from	illusion	for	sense	data,	but	see	little	further	value	in	the	work.1	Some	dispute	that	the	lectures	achieve	even	this	much,	and	claim	that	Austin	and	sense	data	theorists	simply	talk	past	each	other.2	On	the	other	hand,	some	have	decidedly	positive	reactions	but	differ	over	the	text’s	main	purpose:	some	see	far-reaching	ramifications	for	the	philosophy	of	perception;3	others	see	the	work	as	a	prime	instance	of	an	ordinary	language	philosopher	offering	us	therapy;4	while	still	others	find	a	substantive	anti-skeptical	agenda	supported	by	complex	argumentation.5	Philosophers	will	disagree	of	course,	but	the	extent	of	disagreement	about	Austin’s	contribution	is	remarkable,	with	the	main	arguments,	methodology,	and	the	whole	point	of	the	lectures	under	dispute.			Interpreting	Austin	on	perception	starts	with	a	reading	of	his	Sense	and	Sensibilia,	and	interpreting	Sense	and	Sensiblia,	I	believe,	requires	reading	into	the	lectures	key																																																									1	Martin	2007;	Snowdon	2014.	
2	Thau	2004;	Robinson	1994.	
3	Putnam	1994;	Travis	2008.	
4	Locatelli	2014.	
5	Leite	2011.	
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ideas	from	Austin’s	work	on	natural	language	and	the	theory	of	knowledge.	The	lectures	paint	a	methodological	agenda,	and	a	sketch	of	some	first-order	philosophy,	done	the	way	Austin	thinks	it	should	be	done.	Crucially,	Austin	calls	for	philosophers	to	bring	a	deeper	understanding	of	natural	language	meaning	to	bear	as	they	do	their	tasks.	In	consequence	Austin’s	lectures	provide	a	fascinating	start—but	only	a	start—on	a	number	of	key	questions	in	the	philosophy	of	perception.	It	is	easy	to	read	either	too	little	or	too	much	into	them;	finding	the	right	balance	reveals	an	important	view	of	perceptual	knowledge.	My	plan	for	the	paper	is	this:	in	the	next	section	I	provide	a	brief	synopsis	of	Sense	
and	Sensibilia.	In	the	next,	I	discuss	the	picture	Austin	sketches	of	the	role	of	philosophers	in	rationally	reconstructing	commonsense	epistemology,	and	how	this	picture	makes	urgent	an	account	of	the	situation-dependent	meaning	of	our	utterances.	I	then	turn	to	Austin’s	distinctive	contribution	to	questions	about	the	metaphysics	and	epistemology	of	perception.	I	will	argue	(i)	that	he	provides	a	framework	in	which	to	address	some	of	the	central	questions	of	contemporary	philosophy	of	perception,	and	(ii)	this	framework	requires	appreciation	of	the	situation-dependence	of	utterance	meaning.	In	the	conclusion,	I	speak	to	the	wider	import	of	Austin’s	lectures.		A	synopsis	of	Sense	and	Sensibilia	I	think	it	useful	to	give	a	brief	synopsis	of	the	lectures.	(Note	that	chapter	headings	are	not	Austin’s	but	are	to	serve	as	convenient	tags.)	Chapter	I	Introduction		Austin	announces	he	aims	to	examine	the	sense	data	theorist’s	reasons	for	holding	the	doctrine	that	“direct”	perceptual	awareness	is	always	of	sense	data	and	never	of	“material	objects.”	His	concern	is	that	the	facts	of	perception	are	more	diverse	than	the	sense	datum	theorist	allows.	Austin	does	not	aim	to	defend	an	answer	to	the	problem	of	perception6—he	won’t	defend	direct	realism	against	the	sense	data																																																									6	Crane	and	French	2015.	
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theory,	for	instance.	Austin	adds	that	a	“blinkering	philosophical	English”	in	use	by	sense	data	theorists—chiefly	A.	J.	Ayer	and	H.	Price—is	a	distinct	philosophical	mistake;	it	feeds	our	ability	to	ignore	or	distort	the	facts	of	perception.7		Chapter	II	Deception,	Directness	and	Commonsense	Epistemology		Austin	aims	to	show	that	Ayer’s	attempted	recapitulation	of	ordinary	or	commonsense	epistemology	is	inaccurate,	and	he	suggests	that	the	mischaracterization	is	driven	by	an	epistemological	agenda.	(We	will	hear	more	about	the	agenda	in	chapter	IX.)	Ayer	represents	ordinary	thinking	about	perception	as	claiming,	first,	that	we	are	deceived	if	and	only	if	we	don’t	perceive	“material	objects,”	and	second	that	we	are	merely	“satisfied”	with	the	extent	to	which	our	perceptual	beliefs	are	justified.	Austin	takes	issue	with	both	claims:	Commonsense	shows	itself	keenly	interested	in	when	perception	is	direct	or	indirect—on	a	natural	construal	of	those	terms—and	has	it	that	not	all	cases	of	being	deceived	by	the	senses	are	of	the	same	kind.	Second,	commonsense	epistemology	is	more	than	merely	“satisfied”	with	perceptual	justification—in	fact,	the	idea	that	one	might	question	ordinary	perceptual	claims	made	under	paradigmatically	good	circumstances	is	nonsense.	(Austin	will	return	to	perceptual	incorrigibility	in	chapters	IX-X.)	Chapter	III	Opening	Charge	Against	the	Argument	from	Illusion		The	argument	from	illusion	proceeds	in	two	stages:		first,	that	sometimes	what	we	are	directly	aware	of	is	sense	data,	and	second,	that	we	are	always	directly	aware	only	of	sense	data.	Ayer’s	argument	at	the	first	stage	is	by	cases.	Austin	examines	what	Ayer	says	about	each	of	his	cases,	and	cannot	find	reason	to	abandon	ordinary	ways	of	thinking	about	the	perceptual	facts.	A	stick	in	water	looks	bent	(we	might	say	that	for	want	of	a	better	description)	though	it	doesn’t	look	exactly	like	a	bent	stick	out	of	water.	Austin	asks,	must	something	straight	look	straight	at	all	times	and	on	all	occasions?	He	notes	we	readily	acknowledge	that	the	same	thing	looks																																																									7	Ayer	1940;	Price	1932.	
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different	to	us,	depending	on	a	wide	range	of	circumstances.	Any	premise	that	it	must	be	a	different	thing	we	see	on	every	occasion	of	looking	different	flies	in	the	face	of	commonsense.	Chapter	IV	Looks,	Appears,	Seems;	Meaning	in	Context	The	chapter	is	an	interlude	from	the	argument	from	illusion	in	which	Austin	details	some	important	aspects	of	commonsense	epistemology.		Austin	details	the	way	commonsense	finds	it	important	to	distinguish	the	way	a	thing	looks	(or	the	look	of	a	thing)	from	the	way	it	appears	or	seems.	For	instance,	we	might	comment	on	someone’s	looks,	“he	looks	guilty”,	but	reserve	the	use	of	“he	appears	guilty”	for	special	occasions,	where	we	want	to	withhold	judgment.	We	might	use	“he	seems	guilty”	when	evidence	of	guilt	is	mounting,	whether	or	not	he	has	the	look	of	a	guilty	person.	To	talk	about	how	things	seem	is	already	to	express	a	judgment	(43).	Austin	cautions:	“There	is,	of	course,	no	general	answer	at	all	to	the	question	how	'looks'	or	'looks	like'	is	related	to	'is';	it	depends	on	the	full	circumstances	of	particular	cases.”	(39)	So	too,	the	circumstances	of	an	utterance	help	determine	its	meaning.	(41)		Chapter	V	The	Second	Step	of	the	Argument	from	Illusion:	Qualitative	Difference	Austin	briefly	reconstructs	the	argument	for	the	second	step.	Ayer	and	Price	both	claim	that	(i)	“veridical”	and	“delusive”	perceptions	are	qualitatively	the	same.8	Next	(ii)	recall	that	according	to	step	1	of	the	argument,	in	the	“delusive”	case	what	we	are	aware	of	is	a	sense	datum.	But	(iii)	if	what	we	are	aware	of	in	the	“veridical”	case	is	very	different	in	its	nature—a	material	object	and	not	a	sense	datum—then	one	would	expect	experience	to	register	a	difference,	and	distinguish	the	two	perceptions.	But	by	(i)	we	do	not	distinguish	these	perceptions,	so	by	(iii)	what	we	are	aware	of	in	both	cases	is	the	same—a	sense	datum.	Austin’s	central	point	against																																																									8	Austin	notes	that	Price’s	use	of	this	premise	is	different	than	Ayer’s,	as	Price	takes	himself	to	already	have	established	the	doctrine	of	sense	data	and	is	concerned	at	this	point	with	the	question	of	whether	sense	data	are	parts	of	the	surfaces	of	objects.		
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the	argument	targets	premise	(iii):	it	doesn’t	follow	from	the	fact	that	X	is	different	from	Y	in	nature	that	X	looks	different	than	Y	does.	“If	I	am	told	that	a	lemon	is	generically	different	from	a	piece	of	soap,	do	I	‘expect’	that	no	piece	of	soap	could	look	just	like	a	lemon?”	(50)	Chapter	VI	Ayer’s	Evaluation	of	the	Argument	from	Illusion		Austin	recaps	Ayer’s	position.	Ayer	himself	is	not	convinced	by	the	argument	from	illusion,	at	least	if	it	aims	to	demonstrate	that	we	are	always	aware	of	sense	data.	In	
Foundations	of	Empirical	Knowledge	he	is	moved	by	the	objection	Austin	notes	above:	why	shouldn’t	things	very	different	in	nature	look	very	much	alike?	According	to	Ayer,	the	argument	from	illusion	is	not	best	understood	as	answering	a	question	of	fact—namely,	what	in	fact	is	it	that	we	are	directly	aware	of	in	perception?	Rather,	the	conclusion	of	the	argument	answers	a	question	about	how	we	might	talk—what	is	the	best	language	for	describing	perceptual	experience?	Austin	rejects	Ayer’s	idea	that	philosophers	have	the	linguistic	freedom	presupposed	by	Ayer’s	question.9	(59)	For	instance,	he	suggests	that	philosophers	are	constrained	in	what	they	mean	by	“real	shape”	by	what	is	ordinarily	meant	when	people	talk	about	the	real	shape	of	something.	The	point	is	pursued	in	the	next	two	sections.		Chapter	VII	“Real”	Prompted	by	“frequent	and	unexamined	occurrences	of	‘real’,	‘really’,	‘real	shape’	&c.”	in	the	arguments,	Austin	gives	an	excursus	on	uses	of	the	word	“real.”	The	word	“real”	is	“highly	exceptional	…	in	…	that,	unlike	‘yellow’	or	‘horse’	or	‘walk’,	it	does																																																									9	Austin	notes	that	Ayer’s	official	tolerant	stance	about	choices	of	linguistic	framework	is	belied	by	his	actual	view	of	what	is	in	fact	fundamental.	Although	Ayer	represents	his	own	defense	of	sense	data	theory	as	not	a	theory	about	the	nature	of	perception,	but	a	choice	of	linguistic	framework,	in	fact,	he	insists	that	there	are	hard	facts	about	sense	data—they	are	what	really	exist,	and	though	we	may	chose	to	speak	as	if	there	were	material	things,	this	is	a	choice	made	for	convenience.	(60)	Austin	returns	again	to	Ayer’s	views	about	material	things	and	their	relation	to	sense	data	in	chapter	IX,	especially	106ff.	
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not	have	one	single	specifiable,	always-the-same	meaning.”	(64)	It	is	“substantive	hungry”—we	must	be	able	to	specify	some	respect	or	other	in	which	a	thing	is	real,	and	have	an	answer	to	the	question	“A	real	what?”	(68)	Further,	negative	uses	are	basic:	knowing	what	it	is	to	be	“a	real	duck”	requires	knowing	specific	ways	of	being	not	a	real	duck.	(70)	A	thing	that	is	not	a	real	duck	is	not	thereby	immaterial	or	non-existent	(68).	And	what	is	the	shape	of	a	real	duck,	anyway?	The	question	has	no	answer.	(67)	Austin’s	aim	is	to	make	us	wary	of	any	argument	that	our	perceptions	must	not	be	of	a	thing	because	they	“fail	to	reveal	its	real	shape.”	Chapter	VIII	Ayer	on	What	is	“Real”	Austin	considers	Ayer’s	last	chapter	of	Foundations	in	which	he	attempts	to	“furnish	an	explanation	of	the	use	of	the	word	‘real’	as	it	is	applied	to	the	characteristics	of	material	things.”	(80,	quoting	Ayer)	Ayer’s	basic	idea	is	that	those	sense	data	that	are	“privileged”	present	the	“real	qualities”	of	things,	where	what	makes	a	sense	datum	privileged	is	its	predictive	value—sensing	a	datum	from	middle	distance	gives	one	a	better	chance	of	predicting	the	data	one	will	sense	from	other	distances.	Austin	complains	that	the	resulting	judgments	about	“real”	qualities	don’t	square	with	commonsense	judgments.	(“That’s	not	the	real	color	of	his	hair—he	dyes	it”	is	not	a	statement	about	the	lack	of	predictive	value	of	the	relevant	experience.)	In	summary,	Austin	diagnoses	Ayer’s	failure	as	owing	to	a	more	fundamental	failure	to	attend	to	issues	about	natural	language:	it	is	fatal	“to	embark	on	explaining	the	use	of	a	word	without	seriously	considering	more	than	a	tiny	fraction	of	the	contexts	in	which	it	is	actually	used.”	(83)	Chapter	IX	Ayer’s	Argument	for	Sense	Data		Ayer	suggests	that	we	may	choose	the	sense	datum	language,	which	involves	a	
special	philosophical	sense	of	“perceive”	on	which	“what	is	seen	must	really	exist	and	must	really	have	the	properties	it	appears	to	have.”	(102)	Austin	protests:	What	would	motivate	choosing	such	a	language	for	describing	the	empirical	world?	We	couldn’t	use	it	to	talk	about	“material	things”	as	they	don’t	always	have	the	properties	they	appear	to	have.	Ayer’s	official	stance	is	that	the	new	language	has	
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the	advantage	of	avoiding	ambiguities	found	in	natural	language.	But	Austin	reminds	us	Ayer	has	been	unable	to	document	any	such	ambiguities.	Austin	concludes	that	Ayer’s	(and	Price’s)	real	motive	is	to	produce	a	species	of	statement	that	will	be	incorrigible.	(103)	Here	we	find	out	what	Austin	was	alluding	to	in	suggesting	that	an	unstated	“agenda”	lay	behind	the	arguments	of	the	sense	datum	theorists.		Chapter	X	Sense	Data	Theory	and	the	Epistemological	Agenda	In	the	longest	chapter	of	the	book	Austin	delves	into	the	epistemological	agenda	driving	Ayer’s	and	Price’s	sense	datum	theory,	and	into	details	about	commonsense	epistemology.		Ayer	(and	to	an	extent	Price)	is	attracted	to	two	key	epistemic	claims:	first,	that	statements	about	sense	data	form	a	special	class	of	incorrigible	“observation	sentences”,	and	second,	that	such	sentences	can	serve	as	conclusive	evidence	for	other	statements,	and	so	serve	as	an	epistemic	foundation.	Austin	argues	that	no	such	privileged	class	of	sentences	will	be	found,	and	he	notes	that	Carnap	agrees,	although	for	the	wrong	reasons,	supposing	that	the	point	holds	because	what	counts	as	an	“observation	sentence”	is	conventional;	Austin	argues	that	the	point	holds	because	sentences	are	the	wrong	type	of	thing	to	privilege	in	the	first	place.	(111)	No	
kind	of	sentence,	once	uttered,	is	incapable	of	being	amended	or	retracted.	(112)	However,	Austin	notes,	a	particular	utterance	made	in	particular	circumstances	may	be	in	fact	incorrigible.	(114)	(To	have	a	name	for	it,	I	will	hereafter	call	this	“de	facto	incorrigibility.”)	The	possibility	of	de	facto	incorrigibility	is	a	tenet	of	our	commonsense	epistemology,	according	to	Austin.		What	about	the	second	claim,	that	some	sentences	serve	as	conclusive	evidence	for	others?	In	addition	to	reiterating	his	point	about	sentences	being	the	wrong	type	of	thing	to	privilege,	Austin	identifies	several	key	commonsense	epistemic	principles	about	evidence.	First,	not	all	statements	require	evidence	for	their	support.	Sometimes	plain	sight	reveals	the	presence	of	something—you	see	a	pig	in	a	pen—and	“there	is	no	longer	a	question	of	collecting	evidence…	I	can	now	just	see	that	it	
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is…”	(115).	Second,	statements	about	“material	objects”	may	sometimes	be	
conclusively	verified;	it	is	not	the	case	that	conclusive	verification	is	only	secured	for	a	more	privileged	class	of	statement	(117):	suppose	you	see	a	pig,	and	that	the	situation	is	one	where	further	verification	is	called	for.	In	that	event,	you	can	prod	the	pig,	or	do	some	further	biological	tests.	At	a	certain	point	in	your	investigations	you	have	done	quite	enough	(118)	to	conclusively	verify	that	it	is	a	pig.	You	don’t	have	to	rule	out	every	statement	whose	falsity	is	“entailed”	by	the	claim	that	it	is	a	pig.	(123)	Austin	goes	on	to	claim	that	this	marks	a	distinctive	problem	for	foundationalism.	He	has	in	mind	only	foundationalisms	built	on	distinctive	sentence	(types).	(122-123)		We	will	return	to	de	facto	incorrigibility	and	conclusive	verification	below.	Chapter	XI	is	devoted	to	critical	discussion	of	places	in	Warnock’s	book,	Berkeley,	where	Warnock	accepts	the	“two-languages	doctrine”,	with	an	“evidence-language”	and	a	“material-object	language”	(142)	along	Ayer’s	lines.		A	picture	of	philosophical	practice		Austin	gave	his	lectures—later	published	as	Sense	and	Sensibilia—in	1958	at	the	University	of	California,	Berkeley.	According	to	Searle,	he	was	delighted	with	his	time	in	America,	and	was	eager	to	spread	the	word	about	his	vision	of	how	to	do	philosophy.10	It	is	natural	to	imagine	that	he	saw	an	opportunity	to	demonstrate	the	virtues	of	his	approach	to	philosophical	practice.			This	approach	is	portrayed	very	clearly	in	the	lectures.	He	simultaneously	exhibits	and	talks	about	his	preferred	philosophical	methods	throughout.	He	gives	an	extended	statement	about	best	practices	for	philosophers	in	chapter	VII,	after	discussion	of	Ayer’s	suggestion	that	we	consider	the	adoption	of	a	sense	data	language:		
																																																								10	Searle	2014.	
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…	most	words	are	in	fact	used	in	a	particular	way	already,	and	this	fact	can’t	be	just	disregarded.	…	it	is	advisable	always	to	bear	in	mind	(a)	that	the	distinctions	embodied	in	our	vast	and,	for	the	most	part,	relatively	ancient	stock	of	ordinary	words	are	neither	few	nor	always	very	obvious	and	almost	never	just	arbitrary;	(b)	that	in	any	case,	before	indulging	in	any	tampering	on	our	own	account	we	need	to	find	out	what	it	is	that	we	have	to	deal	with;	and	(c)	that	tampering	with	words	in	what	we	take	to	be	one	little	corner	of	the	field	is	always	liable	to	have	unforeseen	repercussions	in	the	adjoining	territory.	And	we	must	always	be	particularly	wary	of	the	philosophical	habit	of	dismissing	some	(if	not	all)	the	ordinary	uses	of	a	word	as	‘unimportant’,	a	habit	which	makes	distortion	practically	unavoidable.	(62-63)	The	picture	Austin	paints	in	Sense	and	Sensibilia	is	of	ordinary	people	with	a	natural	set	of	concerns	and	questions	about	perception—when	it	works,	how	it	justifies,	and	so	on.	Moreover,	ordinary	people	have	answers	to	many	such	questions,	which	form	a	commonsense	theory	that	makes	use	of	important	distinctions,	and	includes	significant	commitments	and	explanations.	Philosophers	have	a	role	in	making	our	ordinary	theoretical	commitments	explicit,	and	to	find	out	about	those	commitments	they	must	attend	to	the	ways	ordinary	people	talk.	Philosophers	also	have	a	role	in	rationally	reconstructing	those	commitments	(that	is	why	ordinary	language	is	not	the	last	word):		Certainly,	when	we	have	discovered	how	any	word	is	in	fact	used	that	may	not	be	the	end	of	the	matter;	there	is	certainly	no	reason	why,	in	general,	things	should	be	left	exactly	as	we	find	them;	we	may	wish	to	tidy	the	situation	up	a	bit,	revise	the	map	here	and	there,	draw	the	boundaries	and	distinctions	rather	differently.	(63)	If	philosophers	are	to	help	sort	out	ordinary	commitments,	they	must	be	very	careful	of	how	those	commitment	are	revealed	by	the	language	ordinary	people	speak.	That	is	to	say,	philosophers	need	a	theory	of	natural	language	meaning.		
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Although	Austin	does	not	provide	this	theory,	he	thinks	a	central	feature	of	it	will	be	the	situation-dependence	of	utterance	meaning.	Austin	stresses	this	point	over	and	again.	What	we	mean	is	always	determined	in	the	particular	circumstance	of	utterance	(16,	41,	111).	At	the	end	of	chapter	IV	he	pleads	with	philosophers	to	pay	attention	to	the	situation	of	the	utterance:		…it	is	not	enough	simply	to	examine	the	words	themselves;	just	what	is	meant	and	what	can	be	inferred	(if	anything)	can	be	decided	only	by	examining	the	full	circumstances	in	which	the	words	are	used.	(41)	Uttering	a	sentence	on	a	given	occasion	involves	a	form	of	words	that	in	another	circumstance	would	have	a	very	different	meaning	or	significance:	Consider,	'That	cloud	is	like	a	horse'	and	'That	animal	is	like	a	horse'.	In	the	case	of	the	cloud,	even	if	we	had	said	it	was	exactly	like	a	horse,	we	should	not	have	meant	that	one	might	easily	mistake	it	for	a	horse,	succumb	to	the	temptation	to	try	to	ride	it,	&c.	But	if	an	animal	is	said	to	be	like	a	horse,	then	probably	it	might	in	some	circumstances	be	mistaken	for	a	horse,	someone	might	think	of	trying	to	ride	it,	&c.	(41)	And	most	pointedly:	…the	question	of	truth	and	falsehood	does	not	turn	only	on	what	a	sentence	is,	nor	yet	on	what	it	means,	but	on,	speaking	very	broadly,	the	circumstances	in	which	it	is	uttered.	(111)	That	the	truth	or	falsity	of	what	we	say	does	not	depend	on	sentence	meaning	alone,	but	is	determined	by	sentence	meaning	in	circumstances,	is	a	key	insight	of	Austin’s.	We	will	return	to	this	insight,	and	see	how	it	informs	Austin’s	positive	contribution	to	a	philosophical	account	of	perception.	
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Austin’s	substantive	results:	the	metaphysics	of	perception	Austin	does	not	develop	situation	semantics	in	the	lectures.	For	that	we	must	look	elsewhere	in	his	work.11	Consequently,	his	substantive	contributions	to	the	theory	of	perception	can	only	be	partial,	by	his	own	lights.	Nonetheless,	Austin	seeks	to	provide	some	compelling	evidence	that	his	approach	will	be	fruitful,	by	sketching	some	substantive	claims.	In	this	section	and	the	next,	I	discuss	the	substantive	claims	Austin	makes	about	the	metaphysics	and	epistemology	of	perception.		The	argument	from	illusion	generates	what	we	today	call	“the	problem	of	perception.”	This	metaphysical	problem	starts	with	a	question:	“What	is	the	direct	object	of	perception?”	Austin	portrays	commonsense	as	rejecting	this	question.	We	directly	see	many	different	things,	and	they	are	not	of	one	kind,	“material”	as	opposed	to	“immaterial”,	say—or	if	these	objects	are	of	one	kind,	it’s	not	the	philosopher’s	business	to	a	priori	decide	what	that	kind	is:	“There	is	no	one	kind	of	thing	that	we	'perceive'	but	many	different	kinds,	the	number	being	reducible	if	at	all	by	scientific	investigation	and	not	by	philosophy.”	(4)	Is	commonsense	theory	of	perception	a	sort	of	naïve	or	direct	realism	then?	Austin	adamantly	is	not	arguing	in	favor	of	realism	either.	His	point	is	that	“What	is	the	direct	object	of	perception?”	is	a	bad	question:	“So	we	are	not	to	look	for	an	answer	to	the	question,	what	kind	of	thing	we	perceive.”	(4)		This	might	lead	us	to	suppose	that	Austin	wants	to	turn	away	from	metaphysical	problems	of	perception	altogether.	This	impression	is	fortified	by	Austin’s	brief	remarks	at	the	end	of	Chapter	III.	There	he	acknowledges	that	Ayer’s	case	of	mirages	is	a	better	case	for	the	sense	datum	theorist	to	use,	but	then	proceeds	in	rapid	succession	to	suggest	that	mirages	are	none	too	like	the	“normal”	case,	and	not	very	frequently	encountered,	and	anyway	there	will	likely	always	be	qualitative	differences	between	experiencing	a	mirage	and	seeing	an	oasis.	To	make	the	matter	of	interpretation	even	thornier,	this	last	suggestion	is	one	he	goes	on	to	repudiate	explicitly.	(52)	All	this	suggests	a	dismissive	and	haphazard	approach	to	the																																																									11	A	central	resource	is	his	paper	“Truth”	in	Austin	1979.		
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metaphysics	of	perception.12	But	it	also	suggests	a	dismissive	approach	that	is	without	a	solid	foundation:	Austin	can	seem	insufficiently	sensitive	to	the	genuine	worries	behind	the	argument	from	illusion.	For	even	if	we	do	reject	“What	is	the	direct	object	of	perception?”	as	somehow	a	bad	question,	certainly	we	can	frame	a	reasonable	question	about	the	metaphysics	of	perception	this	way:	given	that	on	some	occasions	one	can	seem	to	be	in	perceptual	contact	with	an	oasis,	say,	when	there’s	no	oasis	before	one,	what	constitutes	one’s	perceptual	state	in	the	case	when	the	oasis	is	there	as	the	seeing	of	an	oasis?		My	reading	of	Austin	is	that	he	does	not	at	all	ignore	this	last	metaphysical	question	about	perception,	however	badly	he	advertises	his	position.	To	understand	Austin’s	position,	it	is	vital	that	we	register	that	he	has	a	preferred	way	of	addressing	questions	about	the	nature	of	a	target	phenomenon.	His	method	is	to	answer	such	questions	by	first	considering	relevant	contrasts.	So	for	instance,	when	we	wonder	about	the	nature	of	intentional	action,	Austin	has	us	consider	all	manner	of	kinds	of	attempted	or	almost-action.13	When	we	wonder	about	the	nature	of	seeing,	similarly,	Austin	has	us	consider	various	kinds	of	attempted	or	almost-seeing.	In	chapter	IV	Austin	details	the	way	we	distinguish	varieties	of	“almost	seeing,”	noting	that	commonsense	finds	it	important	to	distinguish	the	way	a	thing	looks	from	the	way	it	appears	or	from	the	way	it	seems.	(39-43).	Through	such	observations,	we	get	an	initial	sense	of	what	makes	seeing	different	than	various	cases	of	“almost	seeing.”	What	we	find	is	that	the	relevant	contrasts	are	differentiated	by	a	variety	of	factors,																																																									12	Austin	emphasizes	his	negative	program:	“What	we	have	above	all	to	do	is,	negatively,	to	rid	ourselves	of	such	illusions	as	‘the	argument	from	illusion’…”	(4).	It	is	no	wonder	we	find	readers	thinking	the	lectures	hold	little	more	than	negative	critique.	A	related	complaint	is	that	the	arguments	for	sense	data	theory	that	Austin	criticizes	are	just	bad—bad	in	simple	ways	that	require	no	special	methods	or	meta-philosophical	approach	to	rebut	them	(Martin	2007).	This	complaint	misses	the	fact	that	Austin’s	positive	contribution	in	critiquing	Ayer	is	different	in	kind—Austin	is	not	merely	rebutting	Ayer’s	argument	but	also	demonstrating	the	ways	that	we	can	fail	to	ask	the	right	questions.	
13	See	“A	plea	for	excuses”,	“Ifs	and	cans”,	and	“Pretending”	in	Austin	1979.	
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such	as	our	readiness	to	make	a	judgment,	or	the	role	of	evidence	in	our	judgment.	For	instance,	seeing	that	F	is	distinct	from	being	in	a	state	where	it	appears	that	F,	in	that	we	are	ready	to	judge	that	F	in	the	former	but	not	the	latter	case.	Let’s	call	this	the	“method	of	relevant	contrasts.”	The	idea	is	that	we	ought	not	try	to	answer	the	question	“what	constitutes	one’s	perceptual	state	in	paradigmatically	normal	cases	as	a	seeing?”	bare	as	it	were.	Rather,	we	look	at	a	range	of	nearby	perceptual	states,	and	try	to	determine	what	it	is	that	differentiates	them	from	each	other.	We	ask,	“What	constitutes	one’s	perceptual	state	in	paradigmatically	normal	cases	as	a	seeing	F,	as	opposed	to	its	only	appearing	to	one	as	F?”	Note	here	that,	in	keeping	with	Austin’s	philosophical	methodology,	philosophers	must	look	to	ordinary	ways	of	talking	about	the	differentiation	of	contrasting	cases.	That	in	turn	means	that	philosophers	must	consider	a	wide	variety	of	concrete	instances	where	we	talk	about	the	kinds	of	almost-seeings.	Don’t	ask	about	what	differentiates	seeing	F	from	its	appearing	to	one	that	F,	but	ask,	of	particular	circumstances,	what	differentiates	seeing	the	pig	there	from	its	appearing	that	there’s	a	pig	there?	Concrete	instances	are	important,	as	Austin’s	nascent	theory	of	meaning	dictates	that	it	is	only	with	such	circumstances	in	view	that	philosophers	can	discern	what	we	mean	and	what	we	are	committed	to	by	the	utterances	that	express	our	judgments.	The	method	of	relevant	contrasts	requires	attention	to	the	situation	in	which	our	statements	are	made,	if	it	is	to	deliver	reliable	results.		Austin’s	substantive	results:	the	epistemology	of	perception	Austin	makes	fascinating	remarks	in	Sense	and	Sensibilia	about	the	epistemology	of	perception,	and	to	understand	his	contributions	we	must	integrate	them	with	his	remarks	about	knowledge	and	knowledge	claims.	The	result	is	a	position	that	speaks	to	some	central	preoccupations	of	contemporary	epistemology	of	perception.		In	what	follows,	I	will	confine	myself	to	three	tasks:	first,	I’ll	first	sketch	the	way	I	reconstruct	Austin’s	position	on	knowledge	and	knowledge	claims	and	show	how	this	position	makes	sense	of	Austin’s	position	in	Sense	and	Sensibilia	concerning	de	
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facto	incorrigibility.	14	Then	I’ll	discuss	his	position	concerning	conclusive	verification.	Finally,	I’ll	briefly	describe	the	upshot:	a	distinctive	position	regarding	the	kind	of	reasons	one	has	in	virtue	of	seeing	something.	
Knowledge	and	knowledge	claims	Most	philosophers	are	familiar	with	the	idea	that	Austin	lays	the	ground	for	a	relevant	alternatives	account	of	knowledge	on	which	knowledge	is	true	belief	backed	by	evidence	or	reasons	sufficient	to	rule	out	all	the	relevant	alternatives.15		An	alternative	is,	roughly,	anything	the	truth	of	which	would	defeat	one’s	knowledge	claim.	What	makes	an	alternative	relevant?	I	think	it	best	to	think	of	Austin	as	suggesting	a	reasonable	person	standard	applies:	an	alternative	is	relevant	if	a	reasonable	person	worries	about	it	enough	to	become	unwilling	to	give	an	assurance	about	the	truth	of	the	target	proposition.	This	standard	of	relevance	best	rationalizes	our	practice	of	giving	and	evaluating	assurances.	Visiting	the	farm	with	a	friend	who	asks,	“Are	you	sure	that’s	a	pig?”	you	assure	her,	“Oh	yeah,	I	know	it’s	a	pig.	I	worked	for	years	on	a	pig	farm.”	An	assurance	is	the	speech	act	of	vouching	for	the	truth	of	a	claim,	wherein	one	takes	responsibility	for	having	reasons	to	believe	the	claim,	which	reasons	also	tell	against	all	reasonable	alternatives.	What	one	will	actually	have	vouched	for	with	one’s	assurance	depends	in	part	on	the	meaning	of	the	word	“knows”,	and	in	part	on	the	circumstances	in	which	assurances	are	made.	Recall	here	Austin’s	insight:	…the	question	of	truth	and	falsehood	does	not	turn	only	on	what	a	sentence	is,	nor	yet	on	what	it	means,	but	on,	speaking	very	broadly,	the	circumstances	in	which	it	is	uttered.	(111)	The	meaning	of	“knows”	might	be	simple	and	circumstance	invariant,	roughly,	has	
conclusive	reason	to	think	the	target	belief	is	true.	But	what	one	means	in	the	broader	sense—the	truth	conditions	of	one’s	utterance	of	“I	know”	given	in	an	assurance—																																																								14	Lawlor	2013;	2015.	
15	See	“Other	minds”	in	Austin	1979.	See	also	Sense	and	Sensibilia	(118,	123).	
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depends	on	the	circumstances.	What	it	takes	to	have	conclusive	reasons	depends	on	what	the	alternatives	are,	and	this	is	fixed	by	the	circumstances.	The	alternatives	that	must	be	eliminated	for	one’s	knowledge	claim	to	be	true	are	all	and	only	the	reasonable	alternatives,	and	what	is	reasonable	to	worry	about	depends	on	the	circumstances.	If	one	is	on	a	small	family	farm	in	North	America,	it	is	not	reasonable	to	worry	about	whether	it	might	be	a	peccary.	The	reasonable	alternatives	are	that	the	creature	is	a	cow	or	a	goat,	say.	Those	are	all	the	alternatives	that	need	ruling	out,	and	one’s	visual	experience	of	a	pig	is	enough	to	rule	them	out.	If	in	the	circumstances	it	is	a	pig,	then	one’s	knowledge	claim	is	true.	The	resulting	account	of	knowledge	is	fallibilist,	where	that	means	one’s	reasons	or	evidence	can	be	sufficient	for	knowing	but	logically	consistent	with	the	falsity	of	the	known	proposition.16	This	is	a	feature	of	relevant	alternatives	accounts	of	knowledge.	Adding	to	this	account	an	Austinian	situation	semantics	for	knowledge	claims,	we	can	resolve	some	key	difficulties	that	fallibilist	theories	confront.	I	haven’t	space	to	demonstrate	the	point	fully	here,	though	I	will	sketch	how	situation	semantics	aids	epistemology	below.		I	want	next	to	briefly	develop	how	this	account	of	knowledge	and	knowledge	claims	integrates	with	observations	that	Austin	isolates	for	discussion	in	his	chapter	X,	namely,	the	issues	of	de	facto	incorrigibility	and	conclusive	verification.	His	discussion	of	these	topics	casts	light	on	some	preoccupations	of	recent	epistemology	of	perception.	Recent	epistemology	of	perception	is	concerned	with	(i)	whether	seeing	provides	a	special	sort	of	reason	or	justification—a	“factive	reason”	such	that	one	could	not	have	that	reason	without	the	attendant	perceptual	belief	being	true;	and	(ii)	how	it	might	be	that,	if	seeing	does	not	provide	such	factive	reasons,	seeing	provides	reasons	or	justification	sufficient	for	knowledge.	What	Austin	says	about	
de	facto	incorrigibility	and	conclusive	verification	bears	on	both	these	questions.	
																																																								16	Cohen	1988.	
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De	Facto	Incorrigibility	After	claiming	that	the	actual	agenda	of	sense	data	theorists	is	to	find	a	privileged	class	of	incorrigible	sentences	(chapter	IX),	Austin	begins	his	examination	of	incorrigibility	by	saying,	“The	pursuit	of	the	incorrigible	is	one	of	the	most	venerable	bugbears	in	the	history	of	philosophy.”	(104).	He	notes	that	it	is	a	mistake	to	search	for	incorrigibility	in	statements	about	the	way	things	look: 	…descriptions	of	looks	are	neither	'incorrigible'	nor	'subjective'.	…	certainly	someone	might	say,	'It	looks	heliotrope',	and	then	have	doubts	either	as	to	whether	'heliotrope'	is	right	for	the	colour	this	thing	looks,	or	(taking	another	look)	as	to	whether	this	thing	really	looks	heliotrope.	There	is	certainly	nothing	in	principle	final,	conclusive,	irrefutable	about	anyone's	statement	that	so-and-so	looks	such-and-such.	(42)	Interestingly,	Austin	has	a	diagnosis	of	why	this	is	so,	and	it	has	to	do	with	what	we	mean	with	our	“looks”	talk:	…	the	way	things	look	is,	in	general,	just	as	much	a	fact	about	the	world,	just	as	open	to	public	confirmation	or	challenge,	as	the	way	things	are.	I	am	not	disclosing	a	fact	about	myself,	but	about	petrol,	when	I	say	that	petrol	looks	like	water.	(43)	One’s	commitment	in	saying	“so	and	so	looks	such	and	such”	is	precisely	that	others	will	find	the	look	of	the	thing	a	certain	way,	and	in	light	of	this,	we	should	expect	descriptions	of	looks	to	be	corrigible.	In	spite	of	these	remarks,	it	is	a	mistake	to	suppose	that	Austin	is	dismissive	about	incorrigibility.	Austin	says	no	kind	of	sentence,	once	uttered,	is	incapable	of	being	amended	or	retracted.	(112)	However,	Austin	notes,	a	particular	utterance	made	in	
particular	circumstances	may	be	in	fact	incorrigible	(114):		If	I	carefully	scrutinize	some	patch	of	colour	in	my	visual	field,	take	careful	note	of	it,	I	know	English	well,	and	pay	scrupulous	attention	to	just	what	I‘m	saying,	I	may	say,	‘It	seems	to	me	now	as	if	I	were	seeing	something	pink’;	
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and	nothing	whatever	could	be	produced	as	showing	that	I	had	made	a	mistake.	But	equally,	if	I	watch	for	some	time	an	animal	a	few	feet	in	front	of	me,	in	a	good	light,	if	I	prod	it	perhaps,	sniff,	and	take	note	of	the	noises	it	makes,	I	may	say,	‘That’s	a	pig’;	and	this	too	will	be	‘incorrigible’,	nothing	could	be	produced	that	would	show	that	I	had	made	a	mistake.	Utterances	have	de	facto	incorrigibility	when	“nothing	could	be	produced	that	would	show	I	had	made	a	mistake.”	Austin	stresses	that	this	sort	of	incorrigibility	is	recognized	by	our	commonsense	epistemology.	The	problem	for	the	philosopher	is	to	make	sense	of	the	commonsense	claim	that	Austin	voices,	that	sometimes	“nothing	whatever	could	be	produced	that	would	show	I	had	made	a	mistake.”	This	is	something	we	might	say	on	occasion,	but	how	on	earth	might	it	be	true?	The	task	for	philosophers	is	to	give	a	story	about	our	commitments	in	making	such	claims—and	in	turn	show	that	the	idea	of	de	facto	
incorrigibility	is	intelligible.		What	are	the	truth	conditions	for	an	utterance	of	“nothing	could	be	produced	that	would	show	I	had	made	a	mistake”?	Considering	sentence	meaning	alone	in	isolation	from	circumstances	might	suggest	to	us	the	sentence	when	uttered	is	true	when	there	is	no	possible	world	in	which	the	creature	before	one	is	not	a	pig.	But	such	a	world	is	after	all	possible,	and	so	if	the	truth	conditions	of	our	utterance	are	simply	fixed	by	sentence	meaning,	then	what	we	say	is	false.	Here	is	where	we	can	bring	Austin’s	insights	to	bear.	What	the	modal	claim	“nothing	could	be	produced	that	would	show	I	had	made	a	mistake”	commits	us	to	depends	on	the	circumstances.	The	truth	or	falsehood	of	such	an	utterance	is	a	function	of	sentence	meaning	in	the	circumstances	of	utterance.	Austin	notes	that	utterances	are	only	incorrigible	with	respect	to	the	circumstances	in	which	they	are	made:	…	many	kinds	of	sentences	may	be	uttered	in	making	statements	which	are	in	fact	incorrigible-in	the	sense	that,	when	they	are	made,	the	circumstances	
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are	such	that	they	are	quite	certainly,	definitely,	and	un-retractably	true.	(115)	How	do	circumstances	help	determine	the	truth	or	falsity	of	the	modal	claim?	Here	is	one	way	to	make	this	idea	more	precise.	Suppose	the	case	is	one	where	I	see	a	pig	and	the	reasonable	alternatives	are	that	the	animal	is	a	large	goat	or	a	small	cow,	and	my	visual	experience	rules	out	these	alternatives.	“I	know	it’s	a	pig”	is	true.	Suppose	R	is	an	alternative	to	the	proposition,	P,	that	the	creature	is	a	pig.	The	truth	conditions	for	an	utterance	of	“R	could	be	produced	as	a	cogent	ground	for	retracting	the	utterance	that	P”	are	that	R	is	in	the	circumstances	an	uneliminated	reasonable	alternative.	Consequently,	the	truth	conditions	for	an	utterance	of	“R	could	be	a	cogent	ground	for	retracting	the	utterance	that	P”	are	fixed	by	the	same	reasonable	alternatives	that	fix	the	truth	conditions	of	an	assurance	“I	know	P”	in	the	same	circumstances.17	This	way	of	making	the	idea	precise	seems	to	be	on	Austin’s	mind	when	he	says	…surely	there	will	be	plenty	of	cases	in	which	what	we	say	by	[the]	utterance	will	in	fact	be	incorrigible--cases	in	which,	that	is	to	say,	nothing	whatever	could	actually	be	produced	as	a	cogent	ground	for	retracting	[it].	(114)	Utterances	are	de	facto	incorrigible	in	particular	circumstances	when	there	are	no	
cogent	grounds	in	those	circumstances	for	retraction.	We’ll	say	in	such	circumstances	“nothing	whatever	could	be	produced	that	would	show	I	had	made	a	mistake”,	and	that	will	be	true;	the	circumstances	are	also	such	that	“I	know	it”	is	also	true.	I	want	to	note	that	my	interpretation	on	this	point	may	align	with	some	things	that	Charles	Travis’s	says	about	how	to	interpret	Austin.18	Travis	frames	the	problem	of	perception	this	way:	Let	a	“ringer”	be	a	condition	where,	if	S	were	in	it,	the	condition																																																									17	Note	that	this	reading	makes	sense	of	Austin’s	claims	in	“Other	Minds”	(1979:	159ff)		about	“reasonable	precautions”	being	sufficient	to	show	it	“can’t	be”	anything	else.		
18	Travis	2008.	Travis,	it	should	be	noted,	has	been	calling	for	philosophers	to	appreciate	the	importance	of	Austinian	semantics	for	a	long	while.	
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would	be	indistinguishable	to	her	from	a	condition	in	which	she	seems	to	see	that	p,	yet	in	which	S	does	not	know	p.	Now	we	want	to	accept	this	claim:	Unmistakability:	if	S	knows	p,	then	it	is	for	S	unmistakable	that	p.	Specifically:	(i) It	is	not	the	case	that	for	all	S	can	see,	a	ringer	holds	instead	of	p	(ii) S	sees	that	this	is	so	(“That	what	he	sees	does	not	admit	of	ringers	is	part	of	what	he	sees”	in	knowing	p.19)	But,	Travis	continues,	we	want	to	reject	this	claim:	Distinguishability:	If	S	knows	p,	then	S	can	distinguish	his	state	from	a	ringer	case.	The	question	then	is	how	one	can	hope	to	“grasp	oneself	as	seeing	what	excludes	a	ringer”	since	Distinguishability	is	rejected?	If	we	reject	Distinguishability,	then	it	seems	to	follow	that	for	all	one	can	see,	one	might	be	in	a	ringer	condition.	So	it	seems	that	it	cannot	be	true	that	one	knows	unmistakably	that	p	on	the	basis	of	seeing	p.	As	I	understand	Travis,	he	suggests	that	the	way	forward	is	to	realize	that	“might”	is	an	“occasion-sensitive”	term.	It	is	possible	that	Sid	doesn’t	face	a	pig,	but	an	animatronic	robot;	however	on	this	occasion,	it	is	not	true	that	it	might	be	an	animatronic	robot.	If	I’ve	got	Travis	right	on	this	point,	he	should	find	congenial	my	account	of	the	truth	conditions	for	“nothing	could	be	produced	to	show	I	had	made	a	mistake,”	and	he	should	treat	“might”	similarly.20		Philosophers	have	the	task	of	making	cogent	our	commonsense	epistemic	commitments.	For	philosophers	to	take	up	their	task,	it	is	necessary	for	them	to	keep	in	view	the	situation	dependence	of	the	meaning	of	our	utterances.	As	we	have	
																																																								19	Travis	2008:	292.	
20	It’s	not	clear	that	Travis	would	want	to	adopt	all	that	I	have	formulated	above.	For	instance,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	to	me	what	Unmistakability	comes	to,	whether	it	expresses	a	commonsense	claim	about	seeing,	or	whether	Austin	would	advocate	it.	Also,	Travis	inclines	to	seeing	Austin	as	a	disjunctivist	(Kalderon	and	Travis	2013).	
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seen,	we	can	thereby	make	sense	of	commonsense	commitments	about	the	incorrigibility	of	our	perceptual	claims.		
Conclusive	verification	Austin’s	main	concern	in	passages	where	he	discusses	seeing	and	evidence	(chapter	X)	is	to	counter	Ayer’s	contention	that	we	cannot	be	incorrigible	about,	or	conclusively	verify	statements	about,	ordinary	middle-sized	dry	goods	(“material	objects”).	His	main	complaint,	as	we	have	seen,	is	that	Ayer	imagines	a	type	of	
sentence	that	can	have	a	special	epistemic	role.	But	sentences,	as	distinct	from	utterances	made	in	particular	circumstances,	“cannot	be	divided	up	at	all”	(123)	into	those	which	are	incorrigible,	those	which	provide	evidence	for	other	sentences,	or	those	which	can	(or	cannot)	be	conclusively	verified;	it	is	not	sentences,	but	utterances	made	in	particular	circumstances	that	are	true	or	false.	Moreover,	even	if	we	correct	for	Ayer’s	mistake,	and	consider	utterances	in	circumstances,	it	is	just	not	the	case	that	utterances	about	“material	objects”	will	have	lesser	epistemic	standing	than	utterances	about	experiences	or	sense	data.	He	then	illustrates	this	complaint	with	various	examples.	Some	show	that	utterances	in	circumstances	about	ordinary	“material	objects”	can	be	conclusively	verified.	Other	examples	show	that	sometimes	such	utterances	may	not	stand	in	need	of	“verification.”	(Is	that	your	house?	Have	you	verified	it	is?)	And	others	suggest	that	not	all	statements	about	material	objects	need	evidence:	at	the	barnyard,	one	gathers	evidence	that	there	are	pigs	about,	but	when	one	sees	the	pig	one	does	not	merely	have	evidence.	One	just	sees	that	it	is	a	pig.	(115)		Does	Austin	then	hold	that	in	every	case	“seeing	is	knowing”?	Certainly	that	would	be	an	overly	strong	claim,	and	as	it	happens	not	Austin’s	view.	He	is	explicit	that	it	is	possible	that	one	might	see	something	and	yet	need	to	do	more	in	order	to	have	“conclusive	verification.”	(118-9)	Seeing	the	pig	might	not	be	enough—if	for	instance	one	has	reason	to	think	it’s	a	peccary	in	captivity,	then	one	might	need	to	prod	the	pig	or	do	a	further	test.	In	such	a	case,	seeing	the	animal	is	not	enough	to	have	conclusive	verification	or	knowledge.	A	relevant	alternatives	account	of	
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knowledge	lets	us	say	why	this	is	so—which	alternatives	are	relevant	depends	on	the	circumstances,	which	include	the	target	of	one’s	knowledge	claim	and	what	it	is	reasonable	to	worry	about.		Return	now	to	the	questions	that	occupy	recent	philosophy	of	perception:		(i)	Does	seeing	provide	a	special	sort	of	reason	or	justification—a	“factive	reason”	such	that	one	could	not	have	that	reason	without	the	attendant	perceptual	belief	being	true?	Epistemological	disjunctivists	claim	that	seeing	gives	one	a	special	epistemic	standing	that	does	not	share	a	common	epistemic	factor	with	merely	seeming	to	see;	seeing	provides	factive	reasons,	while	merely	seeming	to	see	does	not.21		Given	what	I’ve	attributed	to	Austin	so	far,	I	think	he	is	not	best	understood	as	an	epistemic	disjunctivist.	First	and	most	generally,	there	is	good	reason	to	think	Austin	is	a	fallibilist,	and	epistemic	disjunctivism	is	strongly	motivated	by	impatience	with	fallibilism.	Second,	as	we	have	seen,	Austin	countenances	the	possibility	that	one	might	need	to	do	more	than	see	the	pig	to	have	“conclusive	verification”	or	knowledge—one	might	need	to	prod	the	pig,	if	that	is	what	is	needed	to	eliminate	reasonable	alternatives.	This	suggests	at	least	that	he	would	resist	the	idea	that	seeing	always	provides	factive	reasons.		Finally,	and	most	importantly:	as	we	have	noted,	there	is	reason	to	suppose	that	Austin	thinks	an	utterance’s	de	facto	incorrigibility	rests	on	what	we	might	call	de	
facto	conclusive	grounds,	and	there	is	a	difference	between	de	facto	conclusive	
grounds	and	factive	reasons.		Let	me	explain.	First,	about	the	epistemic	grounds	of	incorrigible	utterances:	Austin	suggests	that	statements	about	ordinary	“material	objects”	may	be	“conclusively	verified.”	One	way	to	explicate	this	idea	is	in	terms	of	de	facto	incorrigibility.	As	we’ve	seen,	an	utterance	is	de	facto	incorrigible	when	nothing	could	be	produced	in																																																									21	For	instance	in	McDowell	1994;	Pritchard	2012.	
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the	circumstances	as	a	cogent	grounds	for	retracting	it.	One’s	epistemic	grounds	in	making	the	utterance	eliminate	what	are	in	the	circumstances	all	the	reasonable	alternatives	to	its	truth.	In	such	a	case,	the	statement	is	conclusively	verified.	The	epistemic	grounds	one	has	in	making	a	conclusive	verification	are	grounds	one	has	when	one	has	done	all	one	needs	to	eliminate	what	are	in	the	circumstances	all	the	reasonable	alternatives.	Conclusive	verification	involves	having	de	facto	conclusive	
grounds.	But	now,	we	can	contrast	de	facto	conclusive	grounds	with	factive	reasons.	Factive	reasons	are	reasons	you	would	not	have	unless	the	target	proposition	is	true.	
De	facto	conclusive	grounds	are	grounds	that	eliminate	what	are	in	the	circumstances	all	the	reasonable	alternatives	to	the	target	proposition.	It	might	be	that	one	has	de	facto	conclusive	grounds	for	what	is	a	false	proposition.	You	see	what	looks	for	all	the	world	like	a	pig	in	the	barnyard,	but	it	is	a	peccary	shipped	in	from	South	America	on	a	trial	basis.	Your	evidence	gives	you	de	facto	conclusive	grounds	for	thinking	it	is	a	pig,	but	it	isn’t.		For	these	reasons,	I	suggest	Austin	would	resist	the	claim	that	seeing	provides	a	factive	reason.		This	makes	our	second	question	more	pressing:	(ii)	If	seeing	provides	less	than	factive	reasons,	how	can	it	suffice	for	knowing?		This	question	can	be	developed	in	different	ways.	One	way	has	us	asking,	how	can	the	experience	of	seeming	to	see	provide	justification	sufficient	for	knowing,	given	that	this	experience	is	consistent	with	the	falsity	of	one’s	attendant	perceptual	belief?	Here	the	key	is	just	to	make	sense	of	fallibilism	about	perceptual	knowledge.	I	argue	at	length	elsewhere	that	Austin’s	reasonable	alternatives	theory	of	knowledge,	combined	with	his	situation	semantics,	provides	a	coherent	fallibilism.22	Seeing	can	provide	reasons	sufficient	for	knowing.	One	can	know	it’s	a	pig	by	looking,	because	one	can	gain	de	facto	conclusive	grounds	just	by	looking.	If	in	the	circumstances,	the	only	reasonable	alternatives	are	eliminated	by	the	look	of	the																																																									22	Lawlor	2013.		
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thing,	then	one	has	sufficient	reasons	for	knowledge	by	seeing	the	thing.	And	if	in	fact	it	is	a	pig,	then	seeing	can	also	give	one	knowledge.		Another	way	to	push	the	issues	raised	by	(ii)	is	more	overtly	skeptical:	your	seeming	to	see	there’s	a	pig	is	consistent	with	this	all	being	a	dream,	or	your	being	a	brain-in-a-vat	merely	fed	experiences	by	an	evil	scientist.	How	then	can	your	visual	experience	be	the	basis	of	knowledge	if	you	do	not	know	that	you’re	not	just	dreaming	it	all	up?	A	version	of	this	skeptical	argument	is	given	sharper	form	by	Barry	Stroud.23	Stroud	argues	that	our	concept	of	knowledge	has	as	a	necessary	condition	that	if	one	is	to	know	anything	about	the	world,	one	must	know	that	it’s	not	the	case	that	all	of	one’s	present	experiences	are	merely	dream	experiences;	further	Stroud	claims	that	the	condition	cannot	be	filled.		Recently,	Adam	Leite	finds	in	Sense	and	Sensibilia	a	substantive	rejoinder	to	the	Cartesian	external	world	skepticism	articulated	by	Stroud.	24	Much	of	Leite’s	article	suggests	that	Austin	makes	a	straightforward	response	to	the	skeptic,	accepting	the	“Cartesian	condition”,	and	claiming	that	the	condition	is	filled:	I	do	know	that	I’m	not	merely	dreaming	all	this;	I	know	my	experiences	are	not	disconnected	from	the	world	around	me.		I	think	an	alternative	approach	to	skepticism	is	more	readily	attributed	to	Austin.	The	basic	idea	is	to	reject	the	Cartesian	condition.	You’re	at	the	farm,	staring	at	the	pig,	and	perhaps	you’ve	even	prodded	it	a	bit.	You	don’t	need	to	know	that	you’re	not	dreaming	this	all	up	in	order	to	know	it’s	a	pig.	If	we	pay	attention	to	our	actual	
																																																								23	Stroud	1984.	
24	Leite	2011.	I	am	not	certain	how	to	reconcile	Leite’s	claim	that	circumstances	determine	whether	an	alternative	is	defeated	with	his	circumstance-independent	claim	that	we	never	have	reason	to	consider	“merely	metaphysical”	possibilities	when	we	worry	about	what	we	know.	
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practices	of	assurance-giving,	the	challenges	and	defenses	we’re	ready	to	make,	we’ll	see	this	is	so.25	What	more	needs	be	done	to	make	good	on	this	response	to	Stroud’s	Cartesian	skepticism?	Two	large	tasks	now	face	us.	One	is	to	respond	to	Stroud’s	rejoinder	that	ordinary	linguistic	practice	or	judgments	do	not	reveal	the	meaning	of	our	words,	the	content	of	our	concepts	or	the	truth	conditions	of	our	utterances;	an	alternative	skeptic-friendly	semantic	account	is	coherent,	Stroud	insists.	A	second	large	task	is	to	address	apparent	inconsistencies	in	ordinary	knowledge	ascriptions.	For	instance,	it	seems	a	bit	of	commonsense	that	we	know	what	follows	from	what	we	know.	But	“closure”	principles	raise	difficulties.	You	say	you	know	it’s	a	pig.	So	do	you	thereby	know	it’s	not	a	peccary	that	happens	to	look	just	like	a	pig?		You	hesitate.	So	what	is	it?	If	the	answer	is	yes,	then	we’d	like	a	story	about	how	you	could	know	this	on	the	basis	of	a	visual	experience	that	is	exactly	the	experience	you	would	have	were	it	a	pig-like	peccary.	And	if	the	answer	is	no,	then	how	can	you	claim	to	know	it’s	a	pig	in	the	first	place?		Handling	these	questions	is	a	large	task,	and	the	discussion	is	longer	than	space	permits,	so	I	will	just	say	this	much.	First,	Stroud’s	suggestion	that	a	skeptical	semantics	is	a	viable	alternative	semantics	for	our	language	echoes	Ayer’s	suggestion	that	his	sense	datum	language	is	a	viable	alternative	language	for	describing	the	empirical	world.	If	we	want	to	turn	back	Stroud’s	skeptic	on	this	front,	we	do	well	to	return	to	Austin’s	criticisms	of	Ayer	on	this	point.	Second,	on	the	matter	of	closure	generated	paradoxes:	these	paradoxes	can	be	successfully	handled	if	we	develop	Austin’s	insights	about	the	circumstance	dependence	of	meaning.	The	paradoxes	arise	because	we	are	not	attentive	to	the	way	the	truth-values	of	knowledge	claims	depend	on	the	situation	talked	about.26		
																																																								25	Mark	Kaplan	makes	a	strong	case	that	Descartes’	condition	is	not	part	of	our	concept	of	knowledge.	Kaplan	2000.	
26	For	a	compact	statement	of	the	situation	semantic	response	see	Lawlor	2015.	
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Conclusion	It	is	easy	to	read	both	too	much	and	too	little	into	Sense	and	Sensibilia.	Austin	does	not	in	the	lectures	offer	a	systematic	theory	of	perception	or	perceptual	knowledge,	and	we	read	too	much	in	if	we	suppose	that	such	a	theory	lies	entirely	within	its	pages.	Austin	aims	for	his	lectures	to	illustrate	his	ideas	about	how	philosophy	should	be	pursued,	using	the	theory	of	perception	as	an	example.	In	order	to	demonstrate	the	fruitfulness	of	his	approach,	he	delivers	substantive	results	about	perception.	His	contributions	are	partial,	and	necessarily	so,	given	his	own	picture	of	what	the	work	requires.		Austin’s	picture	is	that	commonsense	encodes	important	commitments	about	perception,	and	the	role	of	philosophy	in	clarifying	and	rationally	reconstructing	these	commitments	therefore	demands	attention	to	ordinary	language.	Ordinary	talk	reveals	commonsense	theory,	but	only	if	we	understand	what	utterances	really	commit	speakers	to.	And	to	understand	that,	an	account	of	natural	language	meaning	is	essential	equipment.	But	we	are	cautioned	repeatedly:	the	right	theory	of	natural	language	meaning	will	note	that	utterance	meaning	depends	on	the	situation	in	which	a	thing	is	said.	Austin’s	picture,	which	ultimately	calls	for	the	development	of	“situation	semantics”,	has	great	import	for	philosophical	practice.	The	theory	of	perception	is	where	Austin	chooses	to	advertise	his	picture.	But	the	moral	embedded	in	it	applies	quite	broadly.	His	picture	of	how	to	do	philosophy	requires	philosophers	to	attend	to	the	situation	dependence	of	the	language	in	which	we	express	our	commitments.	We	read	too	little	into	the	lectures	if	we	fail	to	see	this	fact.	While	Austin’s	target	in	the	lectures	is	perception,	and	the	tangles	philosophers	can	get	into	if	they	aren’t	sufficiently	attentive,	his	moral	is	meant	for	all	philosophers	as	they	tackle	a	wide	range	of	issues,	not	just	those	of	perception.	Austin’s	work	is	a	provocation	to	philosophy	as	practiced,	and	an	invitation	to	do	things	differently.	The	provocation	is	still	apt,	and	the	invitation	still	largely	not	accepted.	Most	urgently,	Austin	demonstrates	the	need	for	a	theory	of	natural	language	meaning	
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